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This paper applies spatial econometrics to hamburger price data to 
assess the degree of substitutability of products and locations of 
spatially dispersed franchised chains. First, while intrachain price 
variation exists, I find that hamburger prices at neighboring outlets of 
different chains are spatially uncorrelated. I conclude that their 
products are not close substitutes, which provides an explanation for 
why price promotions have not raised market share. I do find spatial 
price correlation, however, among proximate outlets of separate 
franchisees within the same chain. This finding implies that customers 
view proximate locations of a chain as substitutes. 
 
1.  INT ROD UCTIO N  
 Economists, market researchers, and strategists have long 
recognized that products exhibit varying degrees of substitutability. 
Economists have found substitutability an important concept for 
determining boundaries of markets in antitrust analysis. For 
strategists and market researchers, the level of substitutability 
between (or among) products that appear similar is a vital piece of 
information for determining an appropriate pricing strategy for 
branded products within an oligopolistic industry. 
 In this paper, I use spatial econometric methods to assess the 
level of substitutability among products and locations of spatially 
dispersed multiple-outlet firms. I apply these methods to a cross-
section of prices charged by 1385 locations of the four largest fast-
food hamburger chains across Texas. If the prices at neighboring 
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restaurants of different chains were spatially correlated, I would 
conclude that customers view their hamburgers as substitutes. In this 
case, lowering prices is likely to be effective for taking market share 
away from competition. Further, a relationship between prices of 
proximate restaurants within a chain would indicate that the units are 
sufficiently close together for consumers to view them as substitutes. 
 Reduced-form spatial econometric analysis of a cross section 
of prices is a valuable tool for assessing substitutability. The methods 
involved in this type of analysis differ from traditional methods used 
by economists to estimate cross-price elasticities of branded products 
(e.g., Gasmi et al., 1992) in that they do not require any knowledge of 
quantities sold. The major firms in the fast-food industry, for example, 
are very secretive about quantity information, making traditional 
cross-chain elasticity analysis infeasible in that industry.1 Rather, the 
spatial methods presented here are a spatial analogue to methods 
used by economists and strategists for analyzing temporal interfirm 
price variation without quantity data. Stigler and Sherwin (1985) and 
Slade (1986) used temporal price correlations of homogeneous 
products in different regions to assess whether the regions could be 
considered a part of the same market. More recently, Doane and 
Spulber (1994) and Paul et al. (2001) used temporal price correlations 
to document increasing market integration since deregulation of the 
natural-gas and retail gasoline industries. In their strategy text, 
Besanko et al. (1996) suggested that managers observe temporal 
cross-firm correlations of prices to assess product substitutability. I 
argue here that managers should also assess spatial cross-firm 
correlations of prices for the same reason. 
 To conduct this study, I surveyed 1385 restaurants of the 
largest four hamburger chains in Texas: Burger King, McDonald's, 
Wendy's, and Whataburger.2 Prices were obtained for the flagship 
hamburger at each chain—that is, the Whopper, Big Mac, Single, and 
Whataburger—as a la carte menu items and also for their associated 
"value meals."3 While price variation exists for the hamburgers and 
                                            
1 McDonald's will not even release aggregate sales information or quantities sold for an 
"average" outlet. Thomadsen (2002) uses the combination of consumer location and utility 
maximization as an alternative to the use of quantities in a structural model of spatial competition 
in the fast-food industry. 
2 In 1999, 1857 restaurants of these four chains were listed in the Texas Sales and Use Tax 
Permit Holders database. 
3 The Big Mac, the Whopper, and the Wendy's Single are the three most popular fast-food 
hamburger sandwiches among Americans, according to a survey by Bruskin Goldring Research of 
Edison, NJ. What I refer to as a "meal" includes french fries and a soda. 
 their value meals, I find no correlation of prices across chains at the 
local restaurant level, and I interpret this finding as evidence that 
consumers do not view the hamburgers of the different fast-food 
chains as close substitutes. I do find, however, that price correlations 
exist across proximate outlets within each chain even when separate 
franchisees own the outlets. I interpret this finding to mean that the 
individual restaurants from a given chain are close enough to be 
competing against (or colluding with) each other. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
incentives of fast-food franchisors and franchisees and then presents 
anecdotal evidence regarding the importance, for both firm-level 
strategy and public policy, of a better understanding of cross-chain 
and intrachain competition. Section 2 also presents summary data 
about prices and price variation among fast-food chains. Following the 
presentation of the price data, Section 3 presents details of the spatial 
econometric method. Section 4 discusses the data and definitions of 
variables, and Section 5 contains a discussion of the empirical results. 
Concluding remarks are found in Section 6. 
 
2.  COMPETITI VE  CO NSI DE RATIO NS AND I NCE NTI VE S  
WIT HI N FA S T-FO OD CH AI NS  
 
2.1 INCENTI VES  O F FR ANC HI SORS  AND FR ANCH ISEE S  
 In a typical franchise agreement, a franchisee pays an up-front 
fee along with an annual sales royalty to the franchisor (e.g., the Mc-
Donald's Corporation) in exchange for the use of a trademark and 
associated knowledge at a specified geographic location (often a 
single outlet such as a restaurant). The franchisee keeps the residual 
profit after paying the royalty and expenses associated with the 
maintenance of the outlet. These residual profits are usually 
substantial in large chains, almost one hundred thousand dollars for 
an average restaurant in the case of McDonald's in 1989, even after 
the owner is compensated for management and for capital invested in 
the outlet (Kaufmann and Lafontaine, 1994). Existing franchisees 
often are given the rights to open additional outlets if their adherence 
to the chain's standards is deemed satisfactory. This practice by the 
four chains in this study has resulted in a landscape populated by both 
single-outlet owners and multiple-outlet owners of various sizes. 
Among the 1385 restaurants for which I have valid price data, single-
  
outlet owners owned only 82. 
 The fact that the franchisor receives a royalty on sales rather 
than profits creates tension between the franchisors and franchisees 
regarding price promotions as well as issues of restaurant location. If 
the franchise relationship were a single-period game between the two 
parties, the franchisor would clearly rather maximize sales than fran-
chisee profits. However, the franchisor may face serious legal 
sanctions and public-relations problems if it consistently acts in 
opposition to the interests of the franchisees. These issues are 
explored in more detail in the context of price promotions and 
encroachment in the following sections. 
 
2.2 CROSS-C H AI N COMPE TIT I ON  
 In the 1990s, the nationally active chains such as Burger King 
and McDonald's attempted to compete on many dimensions, 
including new-product introductions and tie-in promotions with films 
and television programs. Pricing promotions, however, remained 
central as their default strategies. The stated rationale for the 
promotions has typically been (1) to gain market share at the expense 
of other chains, and (2) to attract new customers unfamiliar with the 
chain's products (see, e.g., Pledger, 1997; McDowell and Ross, 1997). 
Interestingly, while the fast-food chains have acknowledged that a 
large portion of their revenues come from steady customers known as 
"heavy users," selling larger quantities to these regular customers has 
not become the focus of the firms' marketing efforts (Ordonez, 2000). 
 McDonald's, for example, made national headlines with its 
"Campaign 55," in which customers were offered a Big Mac for 55 
cents. McDonald's official position on Campaign 55 was that it would 
be very effective in increasing market share at the expense of compet-
itors like Burger King and Wendy's and in attracting new customers. 
Independent experts disagreed on both points (see, e.g., interviews 
with industry analysts in Pledger, 1997). Further, many franchisees 
criticized the idea. One disgruntled McDonald's franchisee said of the 
campaign, "All I know is that we've been down for five or six quarters 
and our competitors are doing well and I don't see them selling 55-
cent hamburgers."4 In the end, the campaign did not raise market 
share. 
                                            
4 Interview quoted in McDowell and Ross (1997). 
  The difference in stated opinions on the potential of 
Campaign 55 between the McDonald's Corporation and the 
franchisees may be the result of their different incentives rather than 
the results of different analyses or beliefs. The fact that a sales 
promotion can result in the franchisor's sales royalty increasing while 
the franchisee's profits decrease may be the unstated reason for the 
franchisors' typically greater enthusiasm for such promotions. 
Further, the fact that franchisors need to instigate price promotions 
implies that they and franchisees are at odds on this issue to some 
extent; franchisees who are profit maximizers would choose lower 
prices of their own accord if they perceived that the quantity 
demanded at current prices was too low. Yet, similar disagreements 
exist even among the franchisors' corporate officers who do not have 
any obvious incentive differences. Burger King CEO Jim McLamore 
described a serious disagreement with the company's chief marketing 
officer about whether lowering prices was necessary to retain 
customers in light of a McDonald's discounting strategy. McLamore 
was in favor of lowering prices, while the marketing officer was 
against such a move (McLamore, 1998, p. 235). 
 The fundamental question underlying these stated opinions 
on the effectiveness of price promotions for gaining or defending 
market share from competitors relates to the degree of 
substitutability of the products in the eyes of most consumers. On the 
one hand, if the chains each have a loyal group of customers, then 
lower prices are unlikely to increase market share at the expense of a 
competitor. Rather, lowering prices amounts to the chain selling the 
products cheaper to inframarginal customers within its loyal group. In 
this case, the price reduction would only make sense if the additional 
quantities sold to existing customers were large enough to make up 
for the reduced revenue on inframarginal sales. On the other hand, if 
the customers view the products of the different chains as 
substitutes, then lowering prices would be an effective way of 
capturing market share from competitors. 
 
2.3 INT RAC H AI N COMPE TIT IO N AND ENC RO ACHME NT  
 In addition to possible price competition from other chains, 
the individual franchisees may face competition from restaurants 
owned by others within the same chain. In this case, because the 
menu items are identical, the substitutability in question is strictly 
that of location. If locations are close enough to be viewed as 
  
substitutes by consumers, intrachain competition or collusion will 
result. As the individual franchisees are the residual claimants, 
intrachain competition is obviously detrimental from their point of 
view, while benefiting the franchisor and the consumer. Many 
franchisees have loudly complained of "encroachment"—that is, the 
opening of new restaurants of the same chain within the vicinity of a 
franchisee's existing restaurant— because it reduces their sales.5 
Franchisees of the chains covered in this study have no territorial 
exclusivity built into their contracts and are thus susceptible to such 
encroachment. Despite this, some courts have ruled that the 
franchisor can be held liable if the franchisee loses sales as a result of 
the establishment of a new outlet of the same chain nearby.6 
Franchisees have also appealed to the Federal Trade Commission to 
force franchisors to admit the possibility of encroachment in the Uni-
form Offering Circulars that franchisors are required to show all 
prospective franchisees.7 Further, a bill was recently introduced in the 
U.S. Congress that would give the closest franchisee a right of first 
refusal for the ownership of any new outlets that might impinge on 
the sales of his or her existing outlets.8 
 Despite the publicity that encroachment has received, existing 
evidence comes only from anecdotal accounts of individual franchi-
sees. It is not clear whether intrachain competition is widespread or 
exceptional. Analyses of spatial intrachain price correlation across 
outlets of different owners, such as that presented in this paper, can 
provide more systematic evidence regarding the existence of intra-
chain competition. 
 
2.4 OBSE R VED PR ICE  VARI AT I ON AND  FR ANC HI SEE  INCENT IVE S  
 To make inferences about product and location 
substitutability based on observed prices at different locations, it 
                                            
5 The topic of encroachment has probably received more attention in the trade press over 
the last several years than any other issue related to franchising. See Blair and Lafontaine (2002) 
for an extensive discussion of this issue. 
6 In Burger King v. Scheck, the court ruled that the plaintiff was "entitled to expect that 
Burger King will not act to destroy the right of the franchisee to enjoy the fruits of the contract." 
This ruling was overturned in 1996. 
7 See the Federal Register, October 22, 1999. It reads: "These commenters [franchisees] 
contend that encroachment has a devastating effect upon an individual franchisee who does not 
have a contractual right to an exclusive territory, and they urge the Commission to ban 
encroachment as an abusive and unfair practice." 
8 HR 3308, the Small Business Franchise Act, introduced by Howard Coble (R-NC) and John 
Conyers (D-MI). 
 must be true that prices at the individual restaurants of the chains are 
set independently by franchisees to maximize residual profits at their 
location. As mentioned earlier, a majority of restaurants of the four 
chains in this study are owned by franchisees independent of the 
franchisor. In 1999, franchisees owned all 393 Burger King restaurants 
in operation in Texas, McDonald's franchisees owned 715 of 780, 
Wendy's franchisees owned 189 of 268, and Whataburger franchisees 
owned 139 of 416. 
 Franchisees have an incentive to set prices at levels that 
maximize their residual profits. Further, I argue that franchisees have 
the information required to make profit-maximizing price changes and 
that they do not face prohibitive menu costs (the costs of printing new 
menus) that would be a barrier to price changes. While corporate 
executives of the franchisor may not know how substitutable their 
products are for those of competitors on a national scale, I assume 
that the franchisees do know, at least in the vicinity of their outlets. 
They can easily check the prices at neighboring restaurants and assess 
the effects of any price changes on their own sales. Also, fast-food 
franchisees have a very limited menu of 30 to 40 individual prices to 
manage. As a result, costs involved with price changing should not 
pose a barrier to competitive price responses, as they do, for 
example, for supermarkets that have tens of thousands of prices to 
manage (Levy et al., 1997). Finally, they typically only have to change 
prices on one or two price boards. Thus, they are unlikely to incur the 
menu costs faced by other restaurants that have to print new menus 
when changing prices. 
 Nonetheless, franchisors may pressure franchisees to 
standardize everyday prices, much as they do with national price 
promotions. In May 1999, the time of the survey, the ability of 
franchisees to set prices totally independently of the franchisor was 
not clear. Until November 1997, it was per se illegal for the franchisor 
to dictate prices in franchised outlets. However, as a result of the 
Supreme Court decision in Khan vs. State Oil, the legality of maximum 
resale price maintenance is now decided on a case-by-case basis. 
Minimum resale price maintenance, however, remains per se illegal. 
As of July 2000, McDonald's states that franchisees determine their 
own prices but that they take into account "recommended prices."9 
 Yet, the prices found in the May 1999 survey exhibited 
                                            
9 http://www.mcdonalds.com/countries/usa/corporate/info/faq/index.html. Public 
statements of the other chains on this issue could not be found. 
  
variation that appears consistent with independent price setting 
among franchisees, as do those found in other studies (e.g., 
Lafontaine, 1999; Thomadsen, 2002). If the franchisors are in fact 
setting maximum prices, these do not appear to be binding 
constraints for most franchisees. Further, franchisors would be 
unlikely to set different maximum prices for different franchisees, 
because such action would generate considerable animosity among 
franchisees. 
 Table I shows the average prices of the 1385 outlets that we 
were able to contact, out of a total of 1870 outlets of the four chains 
in Texas that were listed in two sets of online yellow pages. Prices 
shown are without tax and without cheese for the four flagship 
hamburgers as a la carte items and for their associated value meals. 
These prices were also the regular prices and not temporary specials 
or promotional prices. Further, the composition and size of items in 
the value meals were entirely consistent within each chain. More 
information about the survey can be found in Section 5 and in the 
Appendix. 
 
 
3.  THE REDUCED -FORM MODEL OF SPATIAL PRICE 
COMPETITION  
3.1  THE SP AT I AL  ECO NO METRIC  MO DEL  
 In this section, I present a model of spatial price competition 
that will help to establish whether each fast-food chain caters to a 
distinct and loyal group of consumers or whether consumers view 
their products as substitutes. This model is also applied to location 
 substitutability in the case of proximate neighbors of the same chain. 
The underlying reasoning is straightforward. If, on the one hand, the 
flagship burgers of the different chains are viewed as good 
substitutes, franchisees will maximize profits by setting prices based 
partly on the prices of their proximate competitors. In this case, we 
should observe each price to be partially determined by neighbors' 
prices. On the other hand, if customers do not view the products of 
two restaurants as substitutes, the presence of a low or high price at a 
particular restaurant will not motivate the franchisees of neighboring 
restaurants to lower or raise their prices. 
 The purpose of spatial econometrics is to determine whether 
any spatial relationship of the variables is merely random or responds 
to a pattern of spatial dependence. Spatial econometrics has been 
used extensively to measure sociological and technological diffusion 
processes (e.g., Anselin et al., 1997; Tolnay, 1995) and in development 
economics (Case, 1991). Spatial techniques have also been used to 
test for clustering of contract types among gasoline retailers (Pinkse 
and Slade, 1998). Recently, Pinkse et al. (2002) used spatial 
techniques to show that price competition among gasoline 
wholesalers is highly localized. An extensive theoretical discussion can 
be found in Anselin (1988). 
 Two types of spatial correlation can be modeled within 
regression models. The first case, represented by the first line of 
equation (1) below, is a causal relationship of the dependent variables 
of other observations on each focal observation. This model is 
analogous to the temporal autoregressive model that is used, for 
example, to test habit- persistence theory. Because the full vector of 
left-hand-side variables also appears on the right-hand side, this 
model would be particularly similar to a hypothetical temporal 
autoregressive model where the present is influenced by both the 
past and the future. The second case, represented by the second line 
of equation (1), represents a correlation of the error terms of other 
observations on each focal observation and is analogous to an 
autoregressive error model used in temporal time series. The most 
general model, containing both types of spatial correlation, can be 
written: 
 
  
 
 
3.2  SPECI FIC ATIO N O F THE  WEIGH T MATRICE S  
 The n X n spatial weight matrices W and M consist of 
exogenously specified elements Wj and mtj that capture the neighbor 
relations of observations i and j—that is, the extent to which their 
prices should be correlated causally or via the error terms. In the case 
of price competition among outlets of franchised chain firms, two 
such matrices that can appear either as W or M are of particular 
interest. The first of these matrices consists of the neighbor relations 
of an outlet with others owned by different owners within the same 
chain, while the second consists of an outlet's relations with outlets of 
other chains. Owners often own multiple outlets within each chain, 
and these outlets are often neighbors (Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2002). 
Obviously, such outlets do not compete. Thus, within the same chain 
matrix, other outlets of the same owner as the focal outlet are not 
considered neighbors. This is not an issue for the matrix of 
neighboring outlets of other chains, as no owners of outlets across 
multiple chains exist within this sample. 
 These two matrices are referred to below as Ws and Wc in the 
case in which they specify the spatial lag of the dependent variable, 
and as Ms and Mc in the case in which they specify the spatial lag of 
 the error term. The subscript s always refers to the same-chain, other-
owner neighbor matrices, and the subscript c to the cross-chain 
neighbor matrices. 
 I use two approaches to define the value of each element wij 
and mij within the W and M matrices: a distance-based approach and 
a contiguity-based approach. Simply put, the distance-based approach 
assumes a mileage threshold within which all restaurants j are com-
petitors of focal observation i and outside of which they are not. Even 
in rural settings, where travel is relatively fast, fast-food customers 
will rarely travel over three miles for their meals, and almost never 
over five (Salvaneschi, 1996). Therefore, a distance cutoff of four 
miles was chosen for the results presented in this paper. One 
drawback of this approach is that the mileage threshold remains fixed 
regardless of population density in the area. 
 A second approach of defining neighbor relations is based on 
Hotelling models of spatial competition. The level of competition 
between two outlets is driven by whether the outlets are 
contiguous— that is, whether they share a market boundary. A 
Hotelling-style model presented by Levy and Reitzes (1992), for 
example, showed that both for cases of spatial competition and for 
cases of merger of (or collusion among) neighboring outlets, the 
reaction functions for price include only those outlets that share a 
market boundary. One major advantage of the use of contiguity to 
assess neighbor relations is that the boundaries naturally take into 
account heterogeneity in population density in a way that the 
distance threshold does not. In rural areas, the restaurants that share 
a boundary will likely be farther apart than in 
 
FIGURE 1. A THIESSEN POLYGON 
  
 
urban areas. Yet, they will remain neighbors, regardless of the 
distance between them. 
 In a two-dimensional plane, market boundaries are formally 
specified using Thiessen polygons (see, e.g., Kalnins and Lafontaine, 
2002). A Thiessen polygon surrounding a given outlet is constructed 
by drawing lines between that outlet and all other outlets either from 
that same chain or from competing chains, depending upon which 
matrix is being constructed. These lines are then perpendicularly bi-
sected in their middle. In any direction from outlet i, the bisecting line 
that is closest to outlet i forms a side of outlet is polygon in that 
direction and represents a market boundary around outlet i. Figure 1 
illustrates this process. In this figure, outlets A, B, C, E, F, and G all are 
contiguous with the middle outlet, but outlet D is not. Yet, outlets A 
and D are at the same distance from the middle outlet. Therefore, the 
distance-based approach would treat both A and D as competitors of 
the focal outlet as long they fall within a certain threshold, while the 
contiguity-based models would only consider A to be a competitor. 
 Once the neighbors of an outlet have been determined, the 
elements of the matrices need to be weighted. To generate the 
results presented below, I use W and M matrices that, for the 
distance-based definition of neighbor relations, weight all neighbors 
by their inverse distance to the focal observation i and assign 
nonneighboring outlets a value of zero. For the contiguity-based 
definition of neighbor relations, Boots (1980) and other geographers 
have suggested weights proportional to the angle of exposure around 
the Thiessen polygon. Considering Figure 1 again, the angles of 
exposure for outlets B and G are substantially larger than those for 
outlets C and F and would indicate more intense competition with the 
focal outlet. All matrices are then row-standardized by dividing each 
element of a row by the value necessary for the sum of all elements in 
that row to equal one. Row- standardizing allows the coefficients p 
and A to be easily interpreted as an effect of the value of the 
dependent variable at the neighboring outlets—not an effect of the 
number of neighboring outlets, as it would be if the neighboring 
elements were all set equal to their raw inverse distances, for 
example. 
 
 
 3.3 EST IMATIO N TEC HNIQUES  
 Estimation of the general model in equation (1) is difficult, yet 
the consequences of ignoring spatial dependence in models can be 
substantial. On the one hand, if a causal relationship of the dependent 
variables of nearby observations does exist, but the model is 
estimated without the spatial autoregressive term, then a significant 
explanatory variable has been omitted, and the estimated coefficient 
vector f3 will be biased. On the other hand, if the autoregressive term 
is included in an OLS regression, the value of p is biased as well as 
asymptotically inconsistent. 
 Unfortunately, maximum likelihood is not practical for the 
general model; while first-order conditions can be written out simply 
enough (see Anselin, 1988, pp. 61-63), these equations contain deter-
minants of matrices that can be found by the rules of linear algebra 
only for certain special cases of the model. For example, in a case with 
only one matrix W and no M matrices, often referred to as the spatial 
lag model, the solution of the first-order conditions of the likelihood 
function can be reduced to a concentrated likelihood function that is 
nonlinear in only one parameter. In this case, the log likelihood func-
tion can be written as 
 Further, the maximization of the equation can be greatly 
simplified, as the determinant in the above equation can be written as 
a function of eigenvalues. Specifically, 
 
where wi is the ith eigenvalue of W (Ord, 1975). Because of this 
equality, equation (2) can be rewritten as a concentrated likelihood 
function with the only unknown being the autoregressive parameter p 
(Anselin, 1995). The value of p maximizing the concentrated likelihood 
function is then found by evaluating possibilities within the range 
between the smallest and largest eigenvalues of the matrix I - pW 
using a bisection procedure. 
 Unfortunately, the relationship of the determinant and 
eigenvalues no longer holds when there is more than one W matrix, 
  
even without any M matrices in the equation (Hepple, 1976; 
Brandsma and Ketellapper, 1979). Thus, the case under consideration, 
with separate matrices for same-chain competitors and other-chain 
competitors included simultaneously, cannot be easily solved using 
maximum likelihood.10 
 While ML does not allow multiple W matrices or a 
combination of W and M matrices, information about the possible 
effect of the spatial error of a distinct matrix M can be gained by 
applying a Lagrange multiplier test to the residuals of an ML estimate 
of a model that includes a single W matrix. For my purpose, the 
specification is to estimate ps for Ws, the matrix of neighbor outlets of 
different owners within the same chain. The residuals can then be 
used for a test of whether the coefficient Xc of Mc, the matrix of 
neighboring outlets of other chains, is significant. 
The Lagrange multiplier statistic takes the form 
 
where e is the residual from the ML estimation of the spatial lag 
model, A = I - pW, var(ps) is the estimated asymptotic variance of the 
lag coefficient, and tr is the trace operator. Under the null hypothesis 
of Xc = 0, equation (3) will have a chi-squared distribution with one 
degree of freedom. Anselin (1988,105-106) explained the derivation 
of this statistic. 
 The Lagrange-multiplier statistic tests the appropriateness of 
a model with a W matrix, containing neighbor relations for outlets 
within each chain, and an M matrix, containing the neighbor relations 
for outlets of other chains. This specification is theoretically appropri-
ate if there is no cross-chain price competition, but instead the 
demand and supply conditions at nearby outlets of the different 
chains are spatially correlated. Such correlation may affect prices even 
if most customers do not view the products as substitutes at all. Even 
if, for example, half of highly paid downtown office workers strongly 
prefer Burger King and half prefer McDonald's, both groups still would 
be willing to pay more at their respective favorite downtown 
                                            
10 An alternative suggestion has been the use of numerical algorithms to evaluate this 
determinant. Kelejian and Prucha (1998) reported that such algorithms cease to be accurate with 
n = 400. Other authors, such as Bell and Bockstael (2000), have reported that, in some cases, 
solutions could be found with matrices with n up to 2000. 
 restaurants than would workers or residents of less affluent areas. 
Thus, prices at McDonald's and Burger King would be spatially 
correlated in the downtown area even without any actual competition 
or collusion. Similarly, differences in costs may be spatially correlated. 
As potential employees are likely to view jobs in proximate 
restaurants as substitutes, even if customers do not view the products 
as such, unobserved labor-supply variation could lead to spatially 
correlated prices across chains. 
 In light of the difficulty of estimating models with multiple W 
matrices (even in cases without M matrices), Anselin (1988, pp. 82-85) 
suggested the use of a standard instrumental-variables approach. 
Such a model can then be estimated using the well-known two-stage 
least- squares method. For each W matrix, a set of instruments is 
specified that are correlated with Wy but not with We. Anselin 
suggested using WX, the lagged values of the exogenous variables. 
While this specification has merit in general, an efficient use of this 
approach requires that the exogenous variables have a highly 
significant effect on the dependent variable. 
 To increase efficiency beyond that possible via lagged 
exogenous variables, I take advantage of an interesting attribute of 
the spatial competition of fast-food outlets, which is that many 
franchisees own multiple outlets. These owners price similarly across 
their outlets, so for both hamburger prices and meal prices ANOVA 
analyses decisively reject a null hypothesis that within-owner price 
variation is equal to that between owners. The within-owner price 
variation is far lower. As a result, the prices at an owner's outlets that 
are not neighbors of a focal outlet can be used as instruments for 
those that are. Of course, some franchisees own only one outlet (or 
only outlets that are all neighbors to a focal outlet), and those few 
outlets that are surrounded by such outlets must be assigned 
instruments based only on the spatially lagged exogenous variables.11 
 
 
 
 
                                            
11 For this reason, when neighbor relations were determined via contiguity, the same-chain 
instruments and the other-chain instruments for 26 outlets and 18 outlets, respectively, had to be 
based only on lagged exogenous variables. When neighbors were based on distance, 7 and 22 
outlets' instruments had to be calculated in this fashion. 
  
4. DATA AND VARIABLES  
4.1  DAT A COLLEC TIO N AND  PREP AR AT ION  
 The data used in this study come from three sources: the 
Texas Sales and Use Tax Permit Holder Information database, a phone 
survey based on online yellow pages, and the 1990 US Population 
Census. The Texas Sales and Use Tax database contains complete 
street-address and ownership information for all sales-tax-paying 
organizations in Texas, including 1857 individual fast-food restaurants 
of the four chains in this study. To obtain phone numbers for these 
restaurants, I used two sets of online yellow pages: Mapsonus.com 
and Yahoo.com. The combination of these two sets of yellow pages 
yielded 1870 phone numbers purportedly of restaurants of the four 
chains. Finally, all the demographic control variables were obtained at 
the zip-code level from the 1990 US Population Census. 
 To collect pricing information, research assistants attempted 
to contact all of the 1870 phone numbers found in the yellow pages. 
Up to three calls were placed to each restaurant at different times of 
the day. Price information was successfully collected for 1385 res-
taurants. The callers asked for the price without tax and without 
cheese of the four a la carte hamburgers and of their associated value 
meals. They also verified that these prices were regular prices and not 
temporary specials or promotional prices. Finally, they confirmed that 
the composition and size of items in the meals were entirely 
consistent within each chain. For detailed information about the 
survey, see Appendix A. 
 The locations of all 1857 restaurants for which I have valid 
address information from the Sales Tax Permit Holder file were then 
geocoded—that is, they were assigned longitude and latitude (long- 
lat) coordinates based on their street addresses. The geocoding 
process available from a leading online vendor (Etak.com) assigns 
coordinates based on three methods, each with a different level of 
accuracy. First, the actual street number can be identified in the 
database of longlat points. The accuracy of this method is usually 
within 250 feet. Second, even if no longlat points exist for the 
particular street, the street address can be identified as belonging to a 
particular group of nine-digit zip codes, yielding a centroid fairly close 
to the actual location. This method is typically accurate to within a 
quarter mile. Third, the centroid of the five-digit zip code is used as a 
proxy for the location. Of the total of 1385 restaurants with price 
information used as observations, 1121, or 81%, could be identified 
 based on the street number. Another 163, or 12%, could be 
 
identified via the nine-digit zip code, leaving 101, or 7%, that relied on 
the inaccurate five-digit zip code. 
 
4.2 MEASU REMENT O F VARI ABLES  
 This subsection discusses the measurement of all variables 
other than the weight matrices. Descriptive statistics for all variables 
are presented in Table II. 
 First, for the dependent price variables, I subtract the mean of 
each chain's price for that item from each price. As shown in Table I, 
each chain has a different mean price for each item. So, what I test in 
the case of cross-chain competition is whether prices that are above 
(below) average at one location of one chain have an influence on 
whether prices at the neighboring locations of other chains are above 
(below) average. 
 I construct measures of density of other outlets surrounding 
each focal outlet using the locations of all 1857 restaurants in the 
Sales Tax Permit Holder database, not just the ones for which I have 
valid pricing information. The same-chain and cross-chain density 
variables are measured by the count of outlets within an arbitrary 
fixed radius from the focal outlet. The results presented below use a 
four-mile radius. The population and income variables come from the 
1990 Population Census zip-code data. This data provided these 
variables for all but thirteen zip codes with restaurants in this sample. 
For the thirteen zips, I used the populations and income of the closest 
  
zip code for which the census data contained valid information. The 
restaurant, retail-outlet, and gas-station count variables for 1999, also 
aggregated at the zip-code level, are taken from the Sales Tax Permit 
Holder file, which is also the source for the primary data analyzed 
here. The hotel-room count data for 1999 are taken from the Texas 
Hotel Tax Permit Holder file. 
 Further, company-owned (franchisor-owned) restaurants may 
have incentives to charge lower prices than franchisee-owned outlets. 
Lafontaine (1998) discussed in detail the many reasons for the 
different incentives. For example, the franchisors receive the residual 
profit from the company-owned outlets, while they make a 
percentage of sales as a royalty from each franchisee-owned outlet. 
As the franchisor does not face the additional cost of a sales royalty, 
their monopoly equilibrium price at a company-owned outlet will be 
lower than that at a franchisee-owned outlet. A second example is 
that because the franchisors receive the sales royalties from the 
franchisees, they benefit when the franchisees increase sales. Low 
prices at company-owned outlets may generate a positive demand 
externality—that is, they may attract new customers, who will then 
frequent other outlets of the same chain. 
 
5.  RESULT S AND D I SCU SSION  
5.1  RESUL T S  
 The first set of four columns of Table III presents estimation 
results for the a la carte hamburger, and the second set of four 
columns presents results for the value meals. The first two columns 
within each set of four incorporate spatial dependence via W matrices 
defined by the four-mile distance radius, while the last two columns 
use W matrices in which neighbors are defined using contiguity. The 
odd-numbered columns use ML estimation; as discussed earlier, ML 
can only accommodate a single W matrix. I therefore run the 
estimation with only the matrix Ws, which includes the neighbors of 
the same chain but belonging to other owners. To assess whether the 
matrix of other chain neighbors plays a role, I conduct the Lagrange-
multiplier test on the residual errors from all of the ML estimations. 
The results of those tests are presented at the bottom of the tables, 
just above the R2 statistics. The even-numbered columns present 
results with an instrumental variable in place of the lagged dependent 
variable. 
  For both the hamburger and its associated value meal, the 
prices at neighboring same-chain outlets belonging to different 
owners have an effect on the price at the focal outlet. The parameter 
ps associate 
 
 with the matrix Ws in every regression is statistically significant, re-
gardless of the neighbor definition (distance radius or market bound-
ary) or the estimation technique used. As the matrix Ws is row- 
standardized, the value of p of a row-standardized matrix is readily 
interpretable; the value of ps of 0.12 in the first column of Table III, for 
example, indicates that increases in prices of a hamburger at neigh-
boring outlets that average 1 cent will lead to an increase in price in 
the focal restaurant of 0.12 cents. If Ws were not row-standardized, 
the coefficient p would capture not only the average effect of the 
neighboring restaurant prices but also a possible effect of density of 
restaurants around restaurant i. From this set of results, I conclude 
that consumers view nearby locations of the same chain as 
substitutes. 
 From the Lagrange-multiplier tests at the bottom of the tables 
for the ML columns, and the coefficients of pc for the IV columns, the 
effects of the prices at neighboring outlets of other chains are small 
and statistically insignificant in all cases. Based on these results, I 
conclude that there is no significant price competition between the 
chains, nor is there significant regional cost variation, such as might be 
based on labor or real-estate costs, that reflects itself in prices. 
 Turning to other explanatory variables, the same-chain 
density, as measured by the number of outlets of other owners within 
the four-mile radius, is statistically significant and negative for the a la 
carte hamburgers, and negative but insignificant for the value meals. 
This suggests the further possibility of competition in a way that 
cannot be captured by the weights matrices of prices (because the 
weights are row-standardized for each observation). I speculate that 
the density effect on intrachain price competition may be stronger for 
the a la carte hamburgers because those prices are usually the ones 
advertised outside the restaurant. From casual observation, the 
restaurants are much more likely to hang a banner or paint a window 
with the announcement "Whopper 99 cents" than they are with the 
meal prices. Thus, consumers are more likely to be informed about a 
la carte prices before entering a restaurant. 
 Among control variables that were included to capture 
variations in costs and demand, only the gas-station count is 
statistically significant for both prices across all techniques. The gas-
  
station variable was included to capture areas of high demand due to 
high traffic, which would imply higher prices. Such areas would also be 
likely to attract many nonrepeat customers, a group for which lower 
prices would not be effective (as the customers would not know the 
prices until entering the store). The owners would be likely to charge 
higher prices in these types of markets. Yet, these gas-station-rich 
markets have lower prices. I speculate that the low prices may be the 
result of many substitute products in these markets (convenience 
stores and mini-markets attached to the gas stations) that are not 
captured by the density counts or the number of overall restaurants. 
 Company-owned restaurants charge lower prices for the value 
meals but not for the a la carte hamburgers, so these results are at 
least partially consistent with the findings of Lafontaine (1999). Other 
owner characteristics are important for the a la carte hamburgers but 
not for the value meals. The number of years a franchisee has 
operated outlets and the number of outlets owned are both 
associated with lower prices. Although these two variables are highly 
correlated (0.6), each retains its significance even when the other is 
removed from the regressions, indicating that this result is substantive 
and not a product of multicollinearity. Owners with more experience 
may be less likely to yield to franchisor suggestions regarding lowering 
of prices, and these suggestions may be particularly relevant to the a 
la carte hamburgers. The number of outlets owned may create an 
externality from lowering prices: customers will be more likely to visit 
other outlets of the same chain as a result of lower prices, and those 
outlets may well be owned by the same large owners. 
 
5.2 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 I now briefly present several robustness tests. I examined the 
robustness of the above results using models with different variables 
and definitions of variables. I also estimated results on several subsets 
of data that included only observations of specific chains, observations 
with high-quality geocodes, observations with other observations very 
close by, and observations that were owned by franchisees. Finally, I 
estimated some regressions with owner intercepts. 
  First, regressions were estimated with many additional 
independent variables and different variable definitions. Other zip-
code-level census variables included in some regressions but not 
presented were age and level of education. These were not significant 
in any regressions estimated. Further, I redefined restaurant density 
measures using radii of two, three, five, and six miles. Radii greater 
than four miles did not produce any statistical significance, while radii 
of two and three miles produced results almost identical to those with 
the four-mile radius for the value meals. Radii under four miles did not 
produce significant density results for the a la carte hamburgers. The 
density variables presented above were logged, but regressions were 
also estimated with linear versions. The results did not change. 
 Further, it is possible that no cross-chain competitive effects 
were found because only a subset of these chains may be viewed as 
substitutes. Discussions with native Texans indicate that Whataburger 
may be considered distinct from the other three chains. To investigate 
this possibility, I recalculated all density measures and weights 
matrices and estimated all regressions with subsets of the original 
dataset (1) using Burger King, McDonald's, and Wendy's only; (2) using 
Burger King and McDonald's only; (3) using McDonald's and Wendy's 
only; and (4) using McDonald's and Whataburger only. In none of 
these subsets was there any evidence of cross-chain spatial price 
correlation. The intrachain price correlations remained for the two 
subsets that included Burger King. For these subsets, the significance 
level of the parameter ps for IV for the a la carte hamburgers was 
lower, but within the p < 0.10 range. The ML results for the 
hamburger, and results from all estimation techniques for the value 
meals, remained at the same significance levels as those presented in 
Table III. When Burger King was removed from the analysis, the 
intrachain price correlation ceased to be statistically significant for the 
hamburger, but the correlation for the value meals remained at the 
significance levels of the full sample. 
 Another reason for a lack of significance of cross-chain 
competitive effects may have been the somewhat inaccurate quality 
of some of the geocoding. As stated above, the locations of 101 
restaurants were estimated using only a 5-digit zip-code centroid. 
Inclusion of these outlets may have added noise to the weight 
  
matrices and the density measures. I recalculated all density measures 
and weight matrices and recalculated all regressions with a subset of 
the original dataset omitting these 101 outlets. Once again the results 
remained the same for both intrachain and cross-chain price 
competition. 
 Yet another reason for the lack of cross-chain competition 
may be that the outlets of the chains are typically just too far apart—
lack of competition may have nothing to do with whether customers 
view the products as substitutes. I present two reasons why this 
scenario is unlikely. First, 90% of outlets have the outlet of another 
chain within two miles, while 47% have an outlet of the same chain 
within that distance. Yet, there is a correlation of prices for the latter 
case and not the former. If physical distance alone were driving the 
lack of crosschain competition, we should see far less of an effect on 
same-chain outlets than we do. Second, 428 outlets have a neighbor 
from another chain within one-tenth of a mile. I repeated the IV 
regressions on this subset, and there was still absolutely no evidence 
of cross-chain price competition. Intrachain competition was 
statistically significant and higher in magnitude for this sample than 
for the population. 
 I also estimated the IV regressions without any company-
owned outlets and found that the results are very similar. Without the 
company-owned outlets, the significance levels of the parameter ps 
for IV for the a la carte hamburgers were lower, but they were never 
outside the p < 0.10 range. The significance level of the parameter ps 
for the value meals remains consistently significant within the p < 0.05 
level. 
 Finally, I also estimated regressions with separate owner 
intercepts. These showed that approximately half of all hamburger 
price variation is explained by ownership of outlets alone. Future work 
could examine in more depth the cross-owner variation in price. As 
more researchers acknowledge frictions, costs, and other idiosyncra-
sies of pricing, an owner-level study of determinants of pricing would 
help to provide a better understanding of the pricing process. 
 
 6.  CONCLU SIO N :  IMPLIC ATIO NS FO R ST R ATEG Y  
AND POLICY  
 In the late 1990s, fast-food chains alternated between 
promotions emphasizing low prices and those emphasizing the quality 
and uniqueness of their products. The price promotions have been 
widely acknowledged as ineffective in raising market share at the 
expense of the other hamburger chains, although they continue to 
play a prominent, if reduced, role in the strategy of all the major fast-
food chains. The application of spatial econometric techniques to 
hamburger prices in this paper has shown that prices across chains 
show very little spatial dependence. In other words, this paper finds 
no empirical evidence of a relationship between a price at one outlet 
and those of nearby restaurants of the other chains. This finding 
provides an explanation for why the price promotions have not been 
effective: if individual franchisees with incentives to maximize profit at 
their restaurants do not find it optimal to react to the everyday prices 
of nearby restaurants, then it must be that the products are not close 
substitutes for the majority of consumers. Thus, while price 
promotions may have increased sales to those customers who already 
prefer the products of each chain, it is unlikely that they attracted 
customers from the other chains. Further, the fact that intrachain 
spatial correlation of everyday prices does exist indicates that each 
chain's locations are substitutes for at least some consumers. 
Therefore, restaurants participating in promotions may be merely 
enticing customers to substitute away from neighboring outlets of the 
same chain that are not participating in the promotions. 
 Of course, my findings do not indicate that the chains' 
managers can ignore each other when making strategic decisions. The 
lack of cross-chain price correlation occurs within a certain range of 
prices and does not indicate that customers would not substitute 
between these products given greater price differences or that these 
chains do not compete along dimensions other than price. For 
example, the loyalty of consumers to the different chains is largely the 
result of well-thought- out marketing campaigns. Chains create 
campaigns and new menu items specifically in order to differentiate 
their products from those of the competition, a particularly valuable 
strategy in this setting where an oligopoly offering completely 
  
undifferentiated products would be reduced to profitless Bertrand 
competition. Burger King's "Have it your way!" campaign was 
intended as a "direct strike" against McDonald's (McLamore, 1998, p. 
187) and was very successful. Wendy's "Where's the beef?" campaign 
similarly raised market share for that chain. These marketing 
campaigns have attracted the "heavy users," who may be the chains' 
most valuable customers, because they are often not price-sensitive 
(Ordonez, 2000). 
 The evidence that spatial correlation of prices exists within 
chains indicates that franchisors are locating different franchisees' 
outlets close enough together that the franchisees may become active 
competitors or colluders. Whether franchisees should be protected 
from intrachain competition is outside the scope of this paper. Yet, 
the evidence of intrachain price correlation presented here implies 
that by continuing to add new outlets in areas where that correlation 
is substantial, franchisors will be more likely to antagonize franchisees 
and increase the probability that they will face laws that would restrict 
their ability to grow in the future. 
 
APPENDI X .  DET AILE D SU R VEY DE SC RIP TIO N  
 An initial survey was conducted on the weekend of February 
13-14, 1999. University of Southern California seniors called 1372 
restaurants of the four chains and inquired about several prices. These 
included a single large hamburger (the Big Mac, the Whopper, the 
Single, and the Whataburger), the single hamburger meal, the 
"double" version of this burger (only the Big Mac, already a double 
burger, did not have such a version), and the "double" meal. The 
students asked whether the meals included a medium or small "fries" 
and a medium drink. They found that the value meal composition was 
entirely consistent at all outlets within each chain. 
 During this first survey, we discovered several issues that had 
caused problems and rendered some price data unusable. As a result, 
we conducted a second survey between May 18 and May 22, 1999. 
Unfortunately, McDonald's was contacted last. Unknown to us at the 
time, May 21,1999 was the starting date of a nationwide "teenie 
 beanie baby" tie-in promotion. The callers had difficulty getting 
through to many McDonald's as a result, first because of constant 
busy signals, and later because many restaurants had hooked up 
answering machines that announced the available toys. Almost all 
restaurants resumed answering their phones by mid-June, so the 
McDonald's calls were placed between June 20 and June 25, 1999. 
While this lag is unfortunate, it is unlikely that many restaurants 
altered prices significantly in a month. 
 The problems encountered during the first survey and 
corrected included the following. First, employees became annoyed 
when being asked prices for more than two items. The students felt 
that some prices quoted for subsequent items were merely guesses. 
Also, some employees, possibly managers or owners, became 
suspicious and refused to answer any more questions about prices, 
fearing that the callers were competitors. Thus, the May survey was 
reduced to only two items: the a la carte flagship hamburger and its 
associated value meal. 
 Second—primarily a problem at McDonald's restaurants—
some employees would cite the price with tax, while others would cite 
the price without. Third, a problem that involved all chains other than 
McDonald's was that some employees would quote a price that in-
cluded cheese on the hamburger, while others would quote a price 
without. The McDonald's Big Mac includes cheese in the basic price, 
and so this was not a concern in that case. A final problem, mostly at 
Whataburger restaurants, was that employees would often round the 
price up. For example, they would often quote a Whataburger meal 
price of $4. When questioned about the actual price, the surveyors 
found that it could range anywhere from $3.95 to $3.99. 
 To avoid these problems in the survey in May, the students 
asked for prices with and without tax, as well as with and without 
cheese. We also made sure that the employees were not rounding any 
prices up or down. While this did try the patience of some restaurant 
employees, at least it convinced me that we were always getting the 
right prices. Often the employees could not calculate the tax correctly, 
but at least we were then sure that the lower price they quoted of the 
two was in fact the correct nontax price used in all regressions. 
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